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PETITION FOR REHEARING BY APPELLANT 
COMES NOW, Appellant, the State of Utah, by 
and through the Department of Transportation, ("the State' 
and pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil p~ 
cedure, respectfully petitions the Court to grant a re-
hearing in this matter for the purpose of reconsidering 
the Court's ruling heretofore filed on the 11th day of Oc-
tober, 1978. The Petitioner respectfully submits that thi: 
petition should be granted for the following reasons: 
1. The main opinion is based on an error ~ 1 
law as to the correct measure of damages. 
2. There is no substantial evidence to suppor' 
the trial court's award of anticipated profits. 
3. The method of ascertaining the anticipated 
profit adopted by the trial court is either incorrect asa 
matter of law, or the method adopted by the trial court was 
improperly ,~pplied. 
;....~--
4. This Court committed error in affirming the 
award of various other items of damage in that the Court's 
affirmance totally disregarded certain actions by Responden 
Industrial Construction ("the Contractor"). 
S. Petitioner further adopts by reference its 
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing which accompanii 
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this Petition as though set forth herein. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of 
November, 19 7 8. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
9±cwVl_/ ~- 11~ 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Chief, Transportation Division 
Assistant Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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STATEi-lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case arises out of the alleged breach of 
a road construction contract by the State. The Contractor 
claim for damages includes an i tern for anticipated profits 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
presiding, determined that the State breached the contract 
and that the breach constituted an anticipatory breach. n 
court awarded damages totaling $1,346,754.59. 
DISPOSITION IN THIS COURT 
This Court ruled on October 11, 1978 by a bare 
majority that the judgment should be sustained except fora 
award of general damages in the amount of $100,000.00. The 
Court thus sustained an award of $1, 246, 755. 00. The concur 
ring and dissenting opinion concurred in the finding of 
breach but would have awarded a new trial for a correct de· 
termination of damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
For purposes of this Petition for Rehearing the 
State concedes that the contract was breached. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The State now attacks the Court's affirmance 
of damages and only seeks the following relief: 
1. An order remanding this case to the trial 
court for a correct determination of damages; or 
2. An order reducing the existing judgment by 
at least the following amounts (in addition to the deletion 
of general damages ordered by the entire Court) : 
(a) A reduction in the amount of antici-
pated profit awarded the Contractor from the sum 
of $340,025.18 to a sum not in excess of $57,657.83; 
(b) A reduction in the amount awarded 
the Contractor for equipment rented from others 
from $191,370.00 to $63,790.00, or a reduction of 
$127,580.00; 
(c) A reduction in the amount awarded for 
salaries to key personnel from $39,773.48 to 
$13,257.82; and 
)~-. (d) The deletion of the sum awarded by the 
trial court for work done after the date of the 
breach in the total amount of $49,558.18. 
FACTS 
The parties entered into a contract in September 
of 1974 for the construction of a section of Interstate 15 from 
-4-
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North of Holden to Scipio, Utah. A dispute developed in 
the Spring of 1975 concerning the aggregate to be used ~ 
the paving mix. This dispute culminated in the writing 
of a letter by the State which the trial court determined 
to be a breach of contract. (For a more complete descrip· 
tion of the facts leading up to this event, see Appellant's 
Brief on Appeal.) The case was tried to the Court in 1975, 
The issue of liability was tried in March, resulting in a 
determination that the State was liable, and the issue of 
damages was tried in July. The court in its ruling on darn· 
ages awarded judgment for work in progress at the time of 
the breach with certain offsets for partially completed 
i terns and adjustments for measured quantities. The court 
further awarded damages for costs incidental to termination 
of operations by the contractor, including payment for equi;· 
ment rented from others, salaries of key personnel, work per· 
formed after the breach as under a force account (cost plus)· 
arrangement·, and other items. Finally, the Court, after 
further conferences with counsel and the submission of ad· 
ditional briefs, awarded damages for anticipated profit~ 
the amount of $340,025.18 by assuming a factor of 20% of the 
sum left in the contract at the suspension of operations wa: 
profit. Neither the resultant sum of over $340,000.00nor 
the use of the 20% factor was urged by either party, and 
neither finds one iota of support in the record. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Supreme Court on October 11, 1978, sus-
tained the trial court but for the deletion of the sum 
of $100,000.00 general damages. As seen from the of-
ficial Court opinion (actually two opinions), attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A", all five Justices agreed that the 
state had breached the contract. Concerning damages, 
only two of the Justices -- Maughan and Wilkins -- could 
agree on an opinion. That opinion affirmed the trial 
court's award of damages in all particulars except the 
award of $100,000.00 for general or temperate damages. 
Justice Crockett merely concurred in the result of Justice 
Maughan's opinion. The effect of Justice Crockett's con-
currence was to affirm the trial court's judgment of 
$1,346,754.59 minus a deduction of $100,000.00. Justices 
Ellett and Hall, on the other hand, could only agree that 
the State had breached the contract. They disagreed with 
the reasoning of Justices 11aughan and Wilkins as to damages 
in all respects except as to the impropriety of the trial 
* court's awa\.a of $100,000.00 general damages. In par-
ticular, they attacked the award of lost anticipated prof-
its as resting on a method of calculation unsupported by 
law; in doing this they singled out the use of a 20% factor 
as constituting reversible error. 
* As to this, Justices Ellett and Hall make no specific 
mention. The formula they would employ, however, ex-
cludes the possibility of any general damages. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INTRODUCTION 
This case is complicated in that it involves 
many issues going to liability and damages. Understandably, 
it has generated a considerable record. It is also unde~ 
stand<!ble that in attempting to deal with all the many is-
sues, the parties and the Court did not fully analyze t~ 
law and the facts surrounding each issue. The State does 
not wish the Court to reexamine all of the issues of this 
case or even a substantial number of them. For purposesofl 
thjs Petition, the State concedes that it breached the~~ 
tract and concedes that substantial damages should ultimate! j 
be awarded. The State submits, however, that legal error · 1 
permeates the method of calculating damages adopted by the I 
main opinion. It further submits that the measure of damag: 
suggested by Justices Ellett and Hall -- the total contract 
price less amounts already paid and less cost of completion·· 
is required by the great weight of legal authority includic; 
two earlier cases decided by this Court. Alternatively, the 
State urges that even the method of calculation adopted in 
the main opinion was incorrectly applied so that the amount 
of damages reached is unsupported by any evidence. 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT'S CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
RUNS COUNTER TO A FIRMLY ENTRENCHED 
RULE OF DAMAGES ADOPTED BY THIS COURT. 
The most obvious deficiency in the main opin-
ion's discussion of damages is the absence of a statement 
of any controlling rule of damages. Beginning on page 5 
of the opinion, the two Justices discuss one by one the 
items of damage claimed to be excessive. But nowhere do 
they place their discussion in perspective. Nowhere do they 
allude to any principle of law governing damages. The is-
sues involved here, however, are not matters of first im-
pression. There is an abundance of law precisely on point 
and it all supports the measure urged by the dissenters. 
Moreover, both Justice Maughan who wrote the erroreous main 
opinion here and Justice Crockett who concurred here in the 
result have subscribed to and even written opinions in two 
earlier cases embracing the rule of damages they reject in 
this case. 
In Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah, 1976), 
the Court found the site owner in breach of a construction 
-8-
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contract. In a unanimous opinion written by then 
Justice Ellett, the Court stated: 
It is the undisputed law of this stat Y 
and the general consensus of legal writers1; 
that breach of construction contract damages 
are based upon the total amount promised for 
the project, less the reasonable cost of co~ 
pleting it . 
.!_/ Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 23 u.1 
1, 455 P. 2d 197 (1969). 
?./ The Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Sec 
346 (1). 
Concurring in the above language were Justices Crockettm 
Maughan. 
In Keller, footnoted in the foregoing opinion, 
unanimous court also found a site owner in breach of a cor 
struction contract. The opinion expressly affirmed t~fi 
lowing damage formula used by the trial judge there: 
Total contract 
(less) paid by the site owner 
$3,850.00 
1, 500. 00 
Balance if job had been completed $2,350.00 
Less Reasonable cost of completion 500.00 
Contractor's damage $1,850.00 
Except for the numbers, this formula is identical to that 
urged here by Justices Ellett and Hall. The author, inci· 
dentally, of the opinion in Keller was then Chief Justi~ 
Crockett. 
-9-
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In Holman, supra, the unanimous Court also 
referred to the Restatement of Law, Contracts, for support 
for what it called "the undisputed law of this state." 
The Restatement was also invoked by the unanimous Court 
in ~eller, at footnote 3. That footnote expressly refers 
to comment g to Sec. 346 of the Restatement, Contracts, 
which comment states: 
In order to put the builder in as good 
a position as he would have been in had the 
contract been fully performed, it is neces-
sary to give him the full contract price less 
the amount that he saves by reason of the other 
party's repudiation. The amount so saved is 
the cost of completion of the work. 
Illustration 11 of Sec. 346 is on all fours with this case: 
A contracts to erect a building for B 
for $10,000, of which $2,000 is the agreed 
price of excavation and laying foundation 
and is payable on completion of the founda-
tion. After A has completed the foundation 
B repudiates. The cost of completion of the 
building, from the time of the repudiation, 
would have been $6,000 in addition to using 
up materials on hand of the value of $500. 
A can get judgment for $3,500, this being 
,"··the full contract price after subtracting 
$6,500, the cost of completion. 
This Court in Keller also relied on Corbin on 
Contracts, Sec. 1094. In that classic work, the author 
states: 
•.. the building contractor can get judg-
ment for money damages caused by the repudia-
tion or other total breach of the contract by 
-10-
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the owner. These damages include all 
other unpaid instalments of the contract 
price, less the cost of completion of the 
work that is saved to the builder by rea-
son of the repudiation of the [owner] .... 35 
5, Corbin on Contracts (1964), V 1094, p. 509. Footnote 
35 refers to cases following this rule from many state 
and federal jurisdictions, including the United States 
Supreme Court. 
The same rule is stated in the other author-
itative treatise on contracts -- Williston. There it is 
said: 
Where no payments on account have been 
made, a contractor who is not in default 
should recover the total price promised less 
the cost of performing in case no work has 
been done, or of completing performance of 
the work, 7where there has been partial per-formance. 
5, Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Section 1363, 
p. 342. Footnote 7 cites numerous cases in support of this 
principle. 
_:"--It is thus with ample support in the case re-
ports and treatises that this Court said in Holman, supra: 
It is the undisputed law of this state 
and the general consensus of legal writers 
that breach Of construction contract damages 
are based upon the total amount promised for 
the project, less the reasonable cost of com-
pleting it. 
Justices Crockett and Maughan, who fully concurred in the 
above language, should reconsider their contradictory positi 
in this case. 
-11-
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POINT II 
THE FORMULA URGED BY THE DISSENTERS HERE 
AND ALHOST UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED ELSEWHERE 
INCLUDES ANTICIPATED PROFITS. 
One case cited by both Corbin and Williston in 
support of their respective statements of the same rule is 
Guerini Stone v. Carlin, 240 U.S. 264, (280), 60 L.Ed. 636, 
36 S.Ct. 300 (1915). There the Court stated: 
No more definite or certain method of 
estimating profits could well be adopted, than 
to deduct from the K price the probable cost 
of furnishing the matts and doing the work. 
In United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 345, 4 S.Ct. 81, 
28 L.Ed. 168 (1884), cited in Appellant's Brief, the Court 
noted the logical deduction that profits are measured by the 
"difference between the cost of doing work and what [one] was 
to receive for it." As stated in Allen, Heaton & McDonald v. 
Castle Farm Amusement, 86 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ohio, 1949): 
When a plaintiff sues on a contract to 
recover the amount he would have received for 
the full performance prevented by a defendant's 
breach, he seeks in effect to recover as damages 
.the profit from performance of the contract which 
profit defendant's breach prevented him from earn-
ing. In such a case, plaintiff has the burden of 
alleging and proving not only (a) what he would 
have received from the performance so prevented, 
but also (b} what such oerformance would have 
cost him (or the value to him of relief therefrom). 
Unless he proves both of those facts, he cannot re-
cover as damages the profits he would have earned 
from the full performance of the contract. 
The method used in the main opinion to calculate 
anticipated profit is clearly erroneous as a matter of logic 
and contrary to well settled law. But, as discussed below, 
-12-
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even if the method employed is supportable, it was im-
properly if not arbitarily applied. 
POIN'l' III 
THE ASSUMPTION THAT ANTICIPATED PROFIT 
CAN BE CALCULATED BY USE OF A MULTIPLIER 
rs ERRONEOUS AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDElJCE. 
A. NEITHER PARTY SUGGESTED THE USE OF A 
"MULTIPLIER." 
Both the trial court and the main opinion ~ 
this Court apparently believe that anticipated profits 
can be arrived at by using a factor of 20% as anticipat~ 
profit on the remaining items of work. The State dis-
agrees with this concept in this case for the reason t~t 
the evidence does not support this approach. Neither ~rt 
urged this approach to the Court and there is no eviden~ 
to support this method as applied to this contract. 
The trial court and the main opinion are clearl1 
both wrong in suggesting that the "profit" al lowed on a 
force account should govern here. The testimony and the 
special pro.visions (Exh. D-4) both reveal that the 30% al· 
lowed under force account is for "overhead and profit" a~ 
of even more importance, this add-on is added only to the 
total labor amount. In force account work the amount pay· 
able is the total of the labor expended, the cost of the 
material used and the equipment rental. Of these three c~ 
ponents "labor" is usually the smallest factor and general! 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
does not exceed 1/3 of the total cost. It is thus ap-
parent that the 30% allowed for "overhead and profit" 
really amounts to considerably less than 30% of the 
total payment and would usually equate to 10% or less 
as a true "profit." Both opinions are therefore incor-
rect since they erroneously assume that this 30% is a 
factor added on to the entire cost. 
The crucial point, however, is that the evi-
dence regarding a 30% profit only came up in connection 
with the cross-examination of the Contractor's witness, 
Erma Hitchcock. A rough calculation of the claimed 
profit on various items of work to which she had refer-
red indicated a profit of 30%. The cross-examination 
was really a challenge to this percentage of profit since 
it was obviously excessive. Later, in cross-examincation 
of the State's witness Bob Rowley, he testified that 30% 
was added to the labor amount under "force account" for 
"overhead and profit." As can be seen, the two do not 
equate. 
Again, the point here is that neither of the 
parties were attempting to urge that anticipated profit 
be determined by the use of a multiplier. 
B. NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S MULTIPLIER OR ITS MULTIPLICAND 
-14-
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If the trial court's multiplication formula 
is to be used, there are two figures which have to be 
determined; the first is the multiplier percentage. 
The Court's selection of 20% is simply arbitrary. No 
witness said anything about 20%, and no document sup-
ports it. The second figure is the multiplicand or the 
sum to be multiplied. Here again there is no evidence 
to sustain the amount used by the trial court and which 
the main opinion has adopted. 
In the Contractor's memorandum submitted in 
October 1976 (R. f on page 4 the Contractor asserts 
that $1,700,125.93 is the remaining work to be done by 
the Contractor and its subcontractors. This sum was 
selected by the trial court as the multiplicand. The 
Contractor in that memorandum urges the use of a 30% 
multiplier, well knowing that included in that figure 
is some 432,967 cubic yards of roadway excavation having 
a dollar value of $3 9 8, 32 9. 6 4 upon which there is no prof· 
it according to the Contractor's own witnesses. Also in-
cluded are three items totaling $43,658.75 (Bid items 
# 2, 3, and 4) which according to the Contractor's testi-
mony are non-profit items. In addition, there are two 
adjustments for over-payments totaling $129,519.90 in-
volving topsoil and roadway excavation items which would 
* See explanation on page 16 
-15-
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reduce the multiplicand and which are non-profit items. 
There are also items of partially completed work which 
the Court allowed recovery from the State of $167,344.76 
which further reduces the multiplicand. (To leave these 
items in the multiplicand would result in double recovery.) 
Finally, on page 6 of the memorandum of the Contractor 
(R. )*there is a table showing remaining subcontracted 
items of $536,520.36 which is part of the multiplicand 
and it is also shown in the table that the profit on this 
amount is $27,338.31. (In spite of this the Contractor 
has the temerity to urge that it should recover 30% profit 
when its own evidence shows it to be approximately 5%.) 
When the foregoing sums are deducted, the multi-
plicand becomes considerably smaller as the following sum-
mary shows: 
Multiplicand selected by Court: 
Less: 
Roadway Excavation 
Bid items 2,3, & 4 
Overpayments 
Partially completed 
i terns paid previously 
Subcontracted items 
$398,329.64 
43,658.75 
129,519.90 
167,344.76 
536,520.36 
Net Multiplicand 
$1,700,125.93 
$1,275,373.41 
$ 424,752.52 
At this point it is obvious that the remaining 
multiplicand includes the cost of completing the work and 
* In preparation for this Petition the State discovered for 
the first time that the Contractor's Memorandum referred to 
is not included in the file. The trial court obviously had 
the Memorandum, however, since the figures are identical. 
A copy was served on the State in October 1976. 
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profit and the amount of either is uncertain. The use of 
the multiplier at this point would not be too offensive 
if the Court had properly analyzed the evidence. However, 
the State does not believe that the evidence in any way 
will support use of a multiplier due to the arbitrary ~~ 
of it and the fact that its use was never urged during hh 
but is simply an after-thought of the Contractor's counsel 
three months after the trial. 
Again, the State cites the previous ruling ~ 
this Court in the case of Monter v. Kratzers Specialty fut 
Company, 29 U.2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972), where it said, 
" ... a judgment cannot be based upon mere speculation .... " 
It is submitted that the trial court has engaged in specuk 
tion by using a multiplier to calculate damages. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF ANTICIPATED PROFIT IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The main opinion states: 
Defendant has attempted to reargue 
the evidence by submitting certain figures 
on a selective basis. The trial court had 
not only the evidence and exhibits but a 
number of memoranda from counsel concerning 
damages; there is no basis in the record to 
rule the trial court erred. (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
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The above statement is simply wrong. The 
State's evidence merely takes the contract amount and 
adds supplemental agreements which increased the original 
contract amount and then deducts payments already made. 
In doing this, the State is merely applying the rule in 
~olma~ and Keller, supr~. Items of work in the contract 
which according to the Contractor's testimony do not in-
clude profit or which by contract provision are not to 
include profit are deducted. Other work items which are 
to be performed by subcontractors or the joint venture 
Respondent Pritchett are likewise deducted to arrive at an 
amount which represents the remaining work items which the 
Contractor claims include profit. If you take the Con-
tractor's own figures which it claims represent profit and 
deduct those amounts from the bid price, the remainder ob-
viously represents the cost to the Contractor of performing 
those items or work. This is merely a mathematical exercise 
based on documents not disputed by either party and the Con-
tractor 1 s own evidence. The result is a figure far less 
than the sum claimed by the Contractor or allowed by the 
trial court. The State merely askes this Court to examine 
the evidence that was before the trial court to see if it 
sustains the judgment. The State submits that the evidence 
does not. The following summary is fully supported in the 
evidence: 
-18-
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1 
Original Contract Amount 
Supplemental Agreements Added (Exh. D-67) 
TOTAL . 
$6,680.ooo.G 
__ l_O 3, 603.\• 
$ 6 , 7 s 3 ~61JTt 
Earned to date of breach 
(Exh. D-67) 
Unpaid mobilization earned 
(Exh. D-67) 
Unarmortized cost of water 
(Exh. P-52) 
Subcontract amounts (net) 
(Exh. P-41) 
Asphalt (pass through item 
at cost) (Exh.P-4, Sheet 52) 
Roadway excavation (orig. 
quantity less quantity paid 
=432,967 cu.yards a bid 
price of $.92= 
$3,715,324.00 
274,000.00 
19, 5·13. 00 
493,120.00 
1,073,708.32 
398,329.64 (No profit per 
Hitchcock R.10~) 
Items in contract which the con-
traster concedes do not 
contain profit: 
Flagging 
Pilot car 
Obliteration of roads 
Items effectively eliminated: 
Granular borrow 
Items in dispute awarded by 
Court: 
Price reduction 
Clearing and grubbing 
Drilling and shooting 
Pipe, rip-rap, topsoil 
[See Finding of Fact 
26 (d) J 
Stockpiled gravel 
Overpayments·· to Respondent 
found by Court: (Par. 28) 
Roadway excavation 
overpaid(Note 1) 
Roadway excavation paid 
$ 
36,258.75 
5,000.00 
2,400.00 
18,000.00 
1,822.37 
2,000.00 
28,427.45 
124,350.94 
10,734.00 
61,501.08 
for as top soi 1 (Note 1) __ 6_8_,_, -'-O-'-'l--'8-'._8::_2 ___ _,_$_6...:.,_3_3_2--','-5_0_B_. JJ 
MONEY REMAINING IN CONTRACT 
WHICH INCLUDES PROFIT • • $ 451,095.B 
Note 1 - These two deductions represent amounts alrea~~~ 
as roadway excavation; the topsoil amount is ~~ 
for at a higher price. The roadway excavation is 
a reduction for an over payment. since Respondent 
does not claim profit on remaining roadway excava· 
tion the deduction is proper. 
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As can be readily seen, the remaining amount 
of money left in the contract which includes profit also 
must cover the cost of the work involved in those items. 
we have previously analyzed the remaining 9 items using 
Respondent's claimed profit and the bidding schedule to 
calculate the cost of the work which is $420,775.67. (The 
Court is referred to page 31 of Appellant's Brief attached 
as Appendix "B" herein which shows this total cost.) 
If this cost is deducted from the remaining money 
set forth above ($451,095.19), the indicated profit would ap-
pear to be the mathematical difference, which is $30,319.52. 
To the figure of $30,319.52 the profit on sub-
contracts which is conceded to be $27,338.31 should be added 
making a total of $57,657.83 which the State submits is the 
absolute maximum anticipated profit which the Contractor 
could earn using the Contractor's figures and analyzing the 
remClining amount of work in light of the evidence. (Appendix "C") 
At this point the State desires to point out 
that the sum set forth above of $451,095.19 would be a proper 
item for a multiplier, if one could in fact be arrived at, 
since that figure contains ''profit." Contrast this with the 
figure of $1,700,125.93 which the trial court used which con-
tained among other things remaining work to be performed by 
subcontractors of approximately $500,000.00 on which the profit 
was fixed at $27,338.31. 
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The State challenges the statement of the 
main opinion to the effect that it is submitting figures 
on a "selective basis." The figures submitted all apply 
and are all in evidence, mostly by agreement. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S RULING WITH RESPECT TO 
DAMAGES AWARDED SUBSEQUENT TO OCTOBER 
22, 1975 IS ERRONEOUS. 
The State's letter of September 25, 1975 deliVE 
to the Contractor on September 26, 197 5 has been held to c 
tute a breach of contract and for purposes of this Brieft 
breach is conceded. As a result the State became immediat 
liable to pay damages consisting of three main areas: (1) 
in progress at the time of the breach or earned but unpaid 
(2) the cost of terminating and suspending its operations; 
(3) anticipated profits. 
In this case there is no controversy remaining 
over the first area of damage, and we have addressed thet 
area on anticipated profits. The remaining area of contro 
versy is on the cost of suspending operations. 
The contractor claimed to be entitled to reimbu 
ment for equipment rental on equipment leased from others 
also claimed reimbursement for salaries of key personnel, 
other incidental items. The Contractor claimed that t~R 
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going changes were in the area of 6 to 9 months in 
duration. 
The State contended at trial that most, if 
not all these "ongoing damages" could have been termi-
nated without cost to the Contracto~ or that in the 
case of equipment rental contracts they were in fact 
purchase contracts where it was to the Contractor's ad-
vantage to continue the lease payments. The trial court 
awarded these damages for a period of three months in 
the amount of $231,143.48. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial 
court and the main opinion are both in error in that they 
overlook the legal significance of the Contractor's letter 
of October 22, 1975. That letter says in effect that "no 
contract exists" and that the Contractor will complete a 
small amount of paving to enable traffic to be placed on 
the northbound lane and off the existing Highway 91 "solely 
to protect the public." 
In its Brief the State has previously cited 
the case of Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 
301 (1929) for the proposition that the party who stops 
performance of a contract becomes liable for the consequences 
of that action but that the other party cannot thereafter 
"increase the damages" by performance. The case of Blair 
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et al. v. U.S. for Use of GrECgory-Hog~.ri_, __ E:o'0l·, 147 
F.2d 840, also cited in the State's Brief stands for the 
proposition that the party not in breach is not entitled 
to better his condition nor profit by non-performance. 
The State believes that in this case the breaci. 
occurred on September 26, 1975 and was followed by a peric: 
of negotiation which ended with the Contractor's letter~I 
October 22, 1975. The State represents that the evidence 
shows that as of that date all rented equipment could have 
been returned to the owners without any penalty to the Cor.-
tractor. During the period of negotiation between Septembe: 
26, 1975 and October 22, 1975, the State concedes its liabi: 
The work done during the period between October 22, 1975 a:.: 
the actual termination of operations has been paid for by L 
State under the contract unit ~rices for the work done. b 
addition, the trial court allowed recovery under "force ac· 
count" of an additional $49,559.18 for this same work. 
The Contractor in announcing its decision to 
"stand on the breach" as of October 22, 1975 (Exh. P-9) in-
curred a duty to mitigate its damages as of that date. It 
thereafter recovered for all work done beyond that date al-
legedly to "protect the public." The Contractor in fact 
could have returned the rented equipment and terminated the 
employment of its "key personnel" and stopped the running 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of dama9es without any cost on that date. The failure 
of the trial court to recognize the significance of the 
Contractor's written statement of October 22, 1975 and 
its subsequent actions is error. By using the proper 
cut-off date of October 22, 1975, the damages for equip-
ment rented from others would be reduced from $191,370.00 
awarded by the Court to $63,790.00, and the salaries to 
key personnel would likewise be reduced from $39,773.48 
to $13,257.82. 
The main opinion justifies the trial court's 
failure to limit damages to the October 22, 1975 cut-off 
date by saying "defendant persisted in its position that 
it had not breached the contract, plaintiff's retention 
of the equipment and key personnel was a reasonable action 
under the circumstances." The State agrees with that state-
ment so long as the parties are continuing to negotiate. 
The State does not agree with the main opinion after the 
letter of October 22, 1975. The clear statement of the 
Contractor that "no contract exists" should be as equally 
binding on the Contractor as the Court says the State's 
letter of September 25, 1975 is on the State. 
The State believes that the trial Court and 
the main opinion are opting for a double standard by their 
rulings, and the State respectfully submits that the damages 
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allowed by the trial court should be reduced from the 
combined total of $231,143.48 to one-third of that amount 
which is $77,047.82, or the State should have a new trial, 
This is particularly true when you consider the amount the 
trial court awarded the Contractor for the paving done h 
October 1975 of $49,558.18 under a "force account" theory. 
The trial court held that there was a breach of contract 
on September 25, 1975 and then turns around and applies a 
contract theory to calculate the cost of the work in Octob:: 
and ignores the State 1 s written response to the Contractor' 
letter of October 22, 1975, which letter was dated Octoberi 
1975 (P-10) and which clearly stated that any work done wt 
be at "contract rates." 
A reduction as suggested above or a new tri~~ 
rors in this area of damage. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion, Appellant reluctantly 
concedes the fact of its breac~ of the contract for pur-
poses of this Brief and the resulting requirement to respona 
in damages. Appellant does not concede that the damages 
found by the trial court are correct. They are obvious~ 
excessiv~. This Court has apparently reached that conclusio: 
as to general damages. It is respectfully submitted that lt:i 
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evidence viewed in a reasonable light does not sustain 
thP award of anticipated profit. It is further submitted 
that those damages which arise out of events subsequent 
to October 22, 1975 should be disallowed as well. 
The obvious conclusion is that there are 
substantial errors both factually and legally in the judg-
ment of the trial court, and in view of the division of 
opinion apparent in the decision of this Court it would 
be reasonable to remand the case for trial on the issue of 
damages in light of the Court's ruling on the question of 
breach and with the further instruction and guidance as to 
other points at issue in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CiJ~i.~ 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Chief, Transportation Division 
Assistant Attorney General 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing and Brief in Support of Petition for Re-
hearing were mailed, postage prepaid, to John G. Marshall of 
Tuft and Marshall, Attorneys for Respondent Industrial Construc-
tion, Inc., 103 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this 21st day of November, 1978. 
~1;;r;( 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Industrial Co".lstruction, Inc., 
a Nevada corporation, and 
Pritchett Construction 
Company, a Joint Venture, 
-----00000-----
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
The State of Utah, by and 
through the Department of 
Transportation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
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Defendant appeals from a judgment awarding plaintiff, contractor, da ei 
for defendant's breach of a highway construction contract. After a lengthy!. 
which was bifurcated in order to determine first, whether defendant had brea', 
the contract and whether it was a total breach, and second, the appropriatern~ lo 
of damages; the trial court ruled primarily in favor of plaintiff. The dama1. 
1
' 
awarded to plaintiff comp•:msated for work completed and unpaid under the con ag 
for anticipatory profits for the work not completed under the contract, for wnrl 0 
formed for the public safety, the compensation for which was not measuredb1 tu 
terms of the contract, and for damages which the trial court characterizedasi U 
or temperate damages. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed exceptfo: 11 
award of $100,000 for general or temperate damages. Costs are awarded to~: 
Plaintiff, a Nevada corporation entered into a joint venture with Prit~ · 
Construction Company, a Utah corporatio:i to bid on an interstate highwayproj' 
identified as the North Holden to Scipio ;iroject. By stipulation all claims be~ 
Pritchett and defendant have been severed and reserved for trial at a laterdalt' 
Plaintiff was the successful bidder and entered into a written contract withd~ t 
ant, wherein plaintiff agreed to perform certain excavation and constructionw ,, 
in conformity with the plans and specifications prepared by defendant. 
s, 
Incorporated in the contract were certain standard specificatio'1s, unde~ 
which plaintiff had previously performed work. These standard specifications' 
ti a been <>Uperceded ;ind supp!ernented by certain special provision3. The incep , 
·the disp·.ite between the parties involved sheet #56 of the special provisio!ls, w 
·concerned the storage of mineral aggregate (gravel) to be used in the bitumi001 ,0 
surface course of the highway. Sheet #56 required the split stockpile method, 'e 
which entails dividing the gravel into two sep.:i.rate piles according to gradatio'., Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digit za i n provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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F 
b:\ . Exh. A pg. 2 
r tu fcccltng the material into'' hot plant to produce the asphalt material for the 
,iinoris surface course. This specification was new to ~he State of Utah, and 
rk 
her plaintiff nor the resident engineer had prior experience in the o;:ieration of 
a provisio'.1. 
prior to the opening of the bidding the President 0£ plaintiff, who was u"!lsure 
ther sheet #56 ap?lied o::ily to a dryer-drum mixer asphalt plant (the specifications 
which immediately preceded sheet #56), conferred with the Utah State Highway 
inzer. The president was informed sheet #56 did not apply to the type of hot plant 
ations utilized by plaintiff, and if it were the successful bidder, the split stockpile 
lod was not appl.icable. Upon that understanding, the joint venture submitted the nd was awarded the contract. Pritchett was to do the concrete items and a few r items incidental thereto, plaintiff was responsible for the excavation, embank-' construction, and paving work. . plaintiff preceded with the work under the contract which was approximately 
completed on September 26, 1975. On this date, plaintiff had substantially corn-
ed all portio:is of the roadway embankment and concrete structures which could be 
e prior to diversion of the traffic fro.m Highway 91, since the remainder of this type 
ork would interfere with public travel. At this juncture in the construction, plain-
intended to apply two lifts of bituminous surface course to the north-bound lane of 
new highway; so traffic could be diverted thereto and the remaining portion o.f road-
embankment work co'.lld commence. da 
.yt 
ea:· Prior to September 18, 1975, plaintiff was notified by the resident engineer, an 
m~ loyee of defendant, that plaintiff would be required to comply with the split stock-
requirement of sheet #56. Plaintiff communicated the understanding related by 
Ill~: agent of the state prior to bidding that this requirement was not applicable to the 
con, 
othot plant operation utilized by plaintiff; plaintiff requested, according to con-
~ . 
idb tual procedures, an adjustment in the construction method. Plaintiff was informed 
J !low the split stockpile method. The resident engineer requested plaintiff o'.ltline in 
astf! ing its proposal for compliance with the prescribed stockpile method. Plaintiff 
I 01 
l? different contents in each; this proposal was approved by the resident engineer on 1
onded by letter on M. ay 28, 1975, outlining a proposal to construct three stockpiles, 
it 4, 1975. Neither sheet #56 nor plaintiff's letter specified the location of the stock-
1ro .. '~ --- · . 
ie 
dalt: Thereafter, plaintiff constructed three stockpiles; one was lo:::ated at the site of . 
d~ hot plant o::i the north end of the project; the other two were situated at the site of 
nw tiff's crusher on the south end of the project, approximately eight miles in distance, 
available for use as required. The resident engineer knew the location of the sto:::k-
s, since he directed tests thereon to ascertain the contents. 
~::}' Sheet #56 required the contractor to have sufficient material in the stockpile for 
ipti~ atio'.l for two days prior to :::ommencing hot plant operations. There is no provision 
w heet #56 for a redu.!:tion in price for failure to follow the method set forth. Sheets 
:ino~ rough 50 inclu>ive of the special provisions contain the standards ap?licable to the 
od, lor.mance of the bituminous surface course and provide a formula for adjusting the · 
tiol, 'e lil the event the contractor does not fully comply with the standards. The pay 
15167 
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factors for the perforn1ance of the bituminous surface course in the:se pr . 
• • • OV1s, 
include the gradation and bitumen content of the material produced and the de· 
smoothness and roughness of the material as it is laid and compacted. · rV' 
Plaintiff commenced operation of its hot plant on September 18, 197s, 
any notice or objection from defendant concerning its stockpiling method. n: ific 
after and including September 26, 1975, plaintiff produced and placed appro/req 
9, 868 tons of bituminous surface course material, with a contract value ofai: ru 
mately $29, 000 on the north-bound lane of the roadway. All of the bitllllii;. ti• 
material produced by plaintiff was within substantial compliance with the acci ve 
standards of the special provisions of the contract, although some price redui!, a 
under the formula was assessed for failure of the material to meet the gradati, lar 
standard. ., bit! 
the 
On September 23, 1975, the resident engineer by letter to plaintilf ona 
acknowledged three stockpiles had been built but only one was located at the hi: ti' 
plant, plaintiff was directed to add an additional stockpile at that location. On obl 
September 26, 1975, the resident engineer delivered a letter personally to pla~.ess 
tiff's agent in which it was stated that plaintiff had failed to comply with the si~ nee 
stockpile method of sheet #56 or plaintiff's letter of May 28, 1975, relating to~ ·n' 
storage of the mineral aggregate, for that reason defendant refused to pay for' re 
bituminous surface course produced and laid on the roadway to that date. The nc 
upon, plaintiff suspended its operations and asserted to defendant that the ref nti: 
to pay constituted a breach of contract. Plaintiff further denied that it had nol m 
complied with the method of aggregate storage set forth in its letter of May 2!, C• 
On October 1, 1975, defendant, by letter, informed plaintiff that any t 1 
continued operations in violation of defendant's interpretation of sheet #56 wouli till 
be interpreted by defendant as an acceptance by plaintiff of "a suitable price da 
reduction yet to be determined. 11 There was no contractual provision to support the 
defendant's position that it could reduce the price for plaintiff's alleged failure~ gf 
comply with the method set forth in sheet #56. [nol 
e 
'I 
At the time plaintiff suspended its operations, it had placed one liftof 51 
asphalt upon approximately two-thirds of the north-bound lane, which plaintiff 51 
m1 
had intended to pave prior to turning the traffic from Highway 91 thereonto, 
1 . s The traffic could not be diverted onto the north-bound lane prior to comp eti 
of the paving. The location of Highway 91 in relation to the construction proje / 1 
created a danger to the public when the weather turned inclement. In the ictere. 
of protecting the motoring public from the undue risks in traversing the constru1 , 
tion project, plaintiff recommenced operations on October 28, 1975, to finish te 
paving of the first lift on the north-bound lane. With the approval of the resid 01 
engineer, plaintiff turned the traffic onto the north-bound lane, after the pa· m 
was completed to protect the work that had been performed, Pritchett Constru st. 
tion Company con.Hructed a concrete drainage structure, which would drain si 
water away from the portion of the north-bound lane being utilized by the public, d, 
-3-
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Exhibit A pg. 4 
The foregoing recitation constitutes the facts as found by the trial court. 
·: rvey of the record reve~ds substantial evidence to support the findings. 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that neither the original 
'· ification nor the modification as set forth in plaintiff's letter of 1975 contained 
\e uirement as to the location of the three stockpiles. Three stockpiles were tr~cted by plaintiff, one was immediately available to the hot plant, and the 
1; two were available for blending purposes. Plaintiff was reasonably led to 
t· ve it was in compliance with the contract concerning the location of the stock-
:r and on September 18, 1975, plaintiff was allowed by defendant to start up its 
I! lant and commence paving operations without any objection from defendant. 
~'lbituminous surface course produced by plaintiff was in substantial compliance 
the provisions of the contract relating to acceptance standards. There was no 
onable justificatio:'.l for defendant to deliver the letter of September 25, 1975, 
r withholding payment for materials produced through September 26, 1975. 
11
: obligation to pay for the bitumin0'.1s surface co:.irse material was a material 
1
. essential part of the performance required of defendant under the contract and 
1
'' necessary at that point of performance in o:!"der to require the continued per-
i~ ·nee of the plaintiff. Defendant breached the contract by its refusal to (><ly, 
1 ~ refuoal amounted to a total breach and released plaintiff fro::n any further per-
1 nee; defendant's letter of October 1, 1975, further justiiied plaintiff's refusal 
er ntinue performance. The trial court further concluded, at all times prio!" to 
u reach, plaintiff was in full and substantial compliance with the requirements 
'
1 
co:itract. For that reason defendant's counterclaim was dismissed. 
!, 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in its conclusion that 
lilf was in full and substantial compliance with the provisions of the contract. ~i dant urges the plaintiff committed the first breach by its failure to comply ice he method concerning the stockpiling of the aggregate. Defendant claims that orl gh the exact language of either the special provisions or the letter of May, 1975 e~ not specify the location of the stockpiles, anyone of common intelligence would 
t 
that a competent contractor would locate the separate sized piles at the 
f ite, Defendant urges that only one intent can be gleaned from the language 
~ specifications. De~endant quotes the following language from sheet #56: 
minus 4 aggregate shall be fed to the drier at a uniform rate •••• " Defend-
.ti sons there must be two piles consisting of plus four and minus four aggregate 
e, ply with the provision, and, therefore, the language implies the stockpiles 
l)e 1 
e ocated at the plant site. 
re. 
rui The evidence indicated there was a mechanism on plaintiff's hot plant which 
'd ted the amount of fine material being fed into the mix. The project engineer 
1
, owledge of how plaintiff's plant functioned and the location of the stockpiles; 
1 
mitted without obJ'ection the commencement of the hot plant operations. There lro 
, stantial evidence to support a finding that plaintiff reasonably understood that 
IIl , I 
ic, 1In compliance with the special provisions, and the project engineer so con-
d, ~he language as to the location of the stockpiles was ambiguo_u_s_~djhe 
1 demo!].s_trated_th:r.:Q1Jgh,J:,heir conduct their mutual understanding. The ruling 
trial court must be sustained. 
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F>:hib;t" 
I 
Defendant contends the work performecl by Pritchett Constructionc,.t 
as a member of the joint venture, constituted an election by plaintiff to cont~n .. 
5 
formancc after defendant's breach; therefore, plitintiff breached the revived; at 
by its refusal to perform. Defenditnt further contends the work perfonnedb·. ,, 
tiff after September 26, 1975, constituted an election to waive the breach ant,~ 
proceed to perform the contract. The type of work and reason for the work,, u 
disputed issues of fact, which the trial court resolved. The evidence is undi e 
the public safety was placed in jeopardy when plaintiff terminated its perfor;, rr 
The location of Highway 91 in relation to the project was such so that all drai:;, 
would flow onto the highway and create a skating rink in freezing weather, 11• 
potential liability the two members of the joint venture performed essentialwr 10 
divert the traffic to the newly constructed way, where the public could traveli· t 
The evidence indicates that prior to performing this work the agents a' 
plaintiff and defendant discussed the dangerous conditions and potential liabib 
Defendant represented it would respond but failed to do so. Finally on Octobe]o 
22, 1975, plaintiff delivered a letter to defendant stating that in the interesto! 01 
safety of the public, it would perform the work required so that traffic could~ c 
diverted to the north-bound lane. Plaintiff further stated it was entitled to be 1 
on the basis of force account. Plaintiff invited defendant's cooperation since ii 
emergency work being performed under emergency conditions. 
On appeal defendant claims it had considered two contingent plans whicl ir 
would have obviated the work performed. This evidence was excluded, aftera or 
proffer of proof, because defendant's plans were never made known to plaintili p 
an::l could therefore not be probative of plaintiff's intent to waive the breachana Ir' 
perform the contract. There is no evidentiary basis to hold plaintiff bad waivelr 
the breach and proceeded to perform under the contract. 
Defendant further contends plaintiff should have been paid for the erne)r 
work on the basis of the contract prices or in the alternative the reasonable val~ 
of the work. Since the contract had been breached, the cost as set forth there~ 
would not determine the reasonable value of the work. "Force account" prim 
a means used by defendant under a contract to compensate for work not coverea ir 
under the contract. ~.:Plaintiff's evidence concerning the cost of the emergencp : 
followed the "force -a~count" method. The trial court in an oral ruling found!~ I 
into the judgment. Defendant has not presented any evidence the claimed amount 1 
was not the reasonable value of the work; the ruling of the trial court must bes 1 
tained. a 
Defendant further contends the amount awarded as anticipatory profitwa; 
excessive and cannot be supported by the evidence. A plethora of exhibits and 
testimony was presented concerning the cost of the work to be completed and the 
anticipated profit.• In this type of contract, the items of work are separatelylis 
and a contract price per unit is specified. The contractor includes his profitio 1 
item. listed. For example, a price is set in a contract for roadway excavation511 
f•t ' d sum certain per ton. The contractor has computed his expenses and pro 1 in 
mining the amount of his bid on this item. The amount the contractor is ultimJ! 1 
-5- No. (. 
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r·! determined by the number of tons he actually moves, since the parties can only 
I 5 h . h ; ate the tonnage at t c time t e contract is executed. The parties presented con-
. 1·aence ets to the amount of work remaining to be completed and the actual )' g ev . _ - , 
It .!o plaintiff _to perform the work. It sho~ld be ob.served the payments plaintiff had 
·ly received for the work completed included its profits on those items thus its ~I us • 
· es for defendant's breach would be limited to the profits it would have realized on 
·, 'nin" unfinished work. r~ rna1 o 
.:l The trial court found the total remaining under the contract, to be paid for work 
11 
rofit, was $1, 700, 125. 93. The sum of $340, 025.18 was found to be the minimwn 
· t plaintiff could reasonably have anticipated to have earned as profit on the portion 
contract remaining uncompleted on the day of the breach. 
::, In its findings the trial court stated that from proof presented by both parties it 
e:~naccepted computation in determining profit on force account to use 30 percent. 
ti ourt further found that plaintiff's witness testified that in preparing bids a gross 
~ tof 30 percent was anticipated. The court found that such anticipated profit should 
e. duced to a net amount of 20 percent, because of operating expenses, etc. This fac-
e court used to determine plaintiff's anticipated profit. 
Defendant contends that there were a number of items which should not have 
icl included in calculating the sum found to be the amount of work unfinished under 
a ontract. Plaintiff contests the accuracy of defendant's argument. Defendant has· 
~ ted to reargue the evidence by submitting certain figures on a selective basis. 
nl trial court had not only the evidence and exhibits but a number of memoranda from 
veirelconcerning damages; there is no basis in the record to rule the trial court erred. 
~ The defendant further urges that the court's use of an arbitrary multiplier of 20 ri nt to determine the net anticipated profit was unconscionable. . . rak e~Plaintiff' s witness testified there was an anticipated gross profit of $502, 322. 68, 
ell should be reduced by 4 1/ 4 to 4 1/2 percent to determine net profit. The witness 
ed 1ed that depreciation expenses, overhead, payroll taxes, and contributions for 
yi ees to labor organization benefit funds must be deducted to determine net profits. 
the bstantiate the sum anticipated as gross profits, plaintiff's witness testified as to 
at netary figure allocated to profit per ton or per gallon for each item still to be sup-
ourl1under the contract. She further testified that although the percentage of profit may 
rs lrom item to item, generally in preparing a bid, plaintiff submits figures which 
de a 30 percent gross profit. 
war One of defendant's witnesses testified that defendant had established a formula 
d pensate for work which is not done under a contract. The court inquired whether 
the rmula involves taking the costs, as determined by defendant, and then adding 30 
!is nt for additional fa,ctor s. The witness responded affirmatively. Included in the 
io rcent were certain fixed. costs and gross profits. Defendant further presented an 
nsl it calculating plaintiff's anticipated profit as $250, 266. 2 8. In its brief defendant 
1d sthe maximum anticipated profit could be no more than $90, 301. 35. From all 
nal onflicting evidence, the court devised a formula which would determine as accu-
1 i1s possible the anticipated net profits. There is an evidentiary basis to sustain 
ill 
15167 
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the ruling, and defendant has not sustained its burden of showing, frorn the 
the trial court erred. 11 I 
The policy of this Court has been, after reviewing the 
record, not to disturb the trial court's findings if there is 
a reasonable basis in the evidence to support it. 1 
l\,r ; l 
I 
t
nt 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff certa· " ii ln \·'] 
of expense. One of these items was the unrecovered costs for developino 1 t. 0 o 1.1at", 
plaintiff's witness testified that three or four wells were drilled at differentJo.'Jic 
tions on the project. The labor costs for drilling the wells, laying waterlines:, 
setting up storage tanks were determined; this cost was then allocated as an'~ 
"watering" to the various items of work where water was to be utilized· viz 1'. I et~ , ., .i 
amount used at the asphalt plant to control dust, on the untreated base cours , 
e,rtc 
The amount sought by plaintiff was the cost of watering for the items not period 
under the contract since this expense had already been incurred. The witness 1tl 
specifically denied the cost of water was included under the mobilization pro~,' 
in the contract. Defendant presented no evidence on this issue. On appeald;::~~ 
an merely cites the generalized wording in the mobilization provision to sus~jt 
its claim the court erred in its award. Defendant has not sustained its burden, f 
Defendant urges the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff damages fo~t!' 
expenses incurred in retaining certain items of rented equipment and the salari:, 
of certain key personnel after the date defendant breached the contract. Plaint~· 
cross-appeals claiming the trial court should have awarded it the entire costol f 
the rental of the equipment. 
l 
The facts adduced indicated that after plaintiff terminated its performance~' 
in September, 1975, defendant adamantly claimed it had not breached the contractf 
Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action on October 2, 1975, to have this malts 
ter determined, which the trial court resolved in April 1976. In the interim, the I 
parties continued negotiations. Under the circumstances plaintiff retainedand~ 
the salaries for a limited period of time for its grade foreman, rotary drill ope~ 
tor, asphalt forema.n,. and superintendent. Plaintiff also had certain items of; 
equipment which it had rented; some were of such a type they would be difficultto 
locate, if they were' returned to the lessor, and then work was resumed. Thel 
court awarded the entire amount claimed for salaries for key personnel. Howe 
the court limited the equipment rented to three months for the reason the eviden~ 
indicated the equipment could not have been used after the first of the year duelol 
weather conditions. 
Defendant contends the amount awarded for key personnel and equipment I 
rental was unreasonable. This argument is predicated on a letter sent by plain~ 
to defendant on October 22, 1975, wherein plaintiff stated that it considered itsr1 
tract with defenda;nt terminated on that date. Defendant claims the portion ofthi 
award for compensation for damages beyond that date should be disallowed. 
1. Holman v. Sorenson, Utah, 556 P. 2d 499, 500 (1976). 
-7- No.!\!! 
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111 e statement in the letter was made in conjunction with plaintiff's notice to 
1 .. nJ,,nt that certain emergency work was being. performed for the public safety 
r not pursuant to the contract. _si~ce, defenda_nt persisted in its position that it 
j: not breached the contra:t, plaintiff s r_etcntion of the equipment and key per-
i-.nel was a reason.able action unde_r the circumstanc:s· The limitation of three 
nths for the equipment rental, unposed by the trial court, was a rational 
t
, for the reason the equipment could not be utilized under the weather con-
. nee 
'~ 5 after the first of the year. Neither party has sustained its burden to 
.... on , . 
,':)icate the trial court was in error. 
'~ Defendant's arguments concerning offsets and restoration of a price reduction 
tei paving are without merit. 
!"[ 
·
1
'c Finally, defendant contends the award of general damages was not supported 
d 'd 
! 
the ev1 ence. 
;.iq The trial court found plaintiff was unable to bid and bond other work while this 
1 '.~tter was unresolved. The court found the interruption of plaintiff's cash flow 
'.'~aged its cre~it reputation and earning. capacity and subjected it to suits from cred-
irs with resulting counsel fees. The trial court awarded $100, 000 as general or 
!~lniperate damages. 
:::, There is a paucity of facts to sustain this claim. Plaintiff's only witness 
ktcerning this claim testified in a general manner. She stated that the income 
11 
pped; the equipment was idled; the company was unable to meets .its obligations 
was sued by various creditors. The legal actions involved various creditors, 
011 ~nhad supplied equipment or supplies for the project. At the time of trial, 
·aifintiff had no knowledge of the ultimate cost of counsel. The witness .further 
iatl;ti!ied the loss of cash flow impaired the ability of plaintiff to bid and its bonding 
~helpacity, and damaged its credit reputation. 
:~ This action is distinguishable from Laas v. Montana State Highway Commission, 2 
~rein an award to a contractor was sustained for loss of profits because the breach t contract by the state caused the road contractor to lose his bonding capacity. The t tractor presented extensive evidence proving he had always been a successful con-e ctor and had always made a profit on all of his projects for some twenty-two years •. 
:n~e delays by defendant had forced the contractor into debt and he had thus lost his 
·lo['lding capacity and thereby lost profits for a period of three years. · 
In the instant case, plaintiff presented no evidence relating its loss of bonding 
1tl,acity to its historical profit ability. Plaintiff did not even specify the number of 
n~ suits initiated against it; neither did it identify the parties nor the circumstances 
.c ·olved. There was no evidence as to plaintiff's credit reputation and the degree, if 
;her, it Was impaired. 
I 
I Plaintiff has relied· on the concept of temper.ate damages to overcome the 
-rdentiary deficiency. This principle is not applicable in this type of action. Prior 
[the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the common law presumed substan-
ldumage (temperate damages), without any proof of actual damage, when a bank 11;ton~ftt!Jy dishonored the check of a depositor, who was a merchant or trader. 
Mont., 483 P. 2d 699 (1971). 
-Sl-
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I j I. 
The in1peachment of the depositor's credit ;u1cl repute in the lHi~i!ft~\i~,~~J,j i 
deemed to resemble closely cases of libel ancl sbnder. The jury could ai':.I 
temperate damages as they conceived to be reasonable compensation for r 
indefinite mischief, which such an act must be assumed to have been inflict' 
according to the ordinary course of human events. 3 
This court cannot presume, without proof of actual damage, that a par 
has sustained substantial damage in a typical breach of contract action, 1 judgment of the trial court awarding general damages in the sum of $100,0o~ 
reversed, the remainder of the judgment is affirmed. · 
This opinion adds nothing new to the law, thus it is not to be publishei 
in the Pacific or Utah Reports. 
I CONCUR: 
D. Frank Wilkins, Justice 
Crockett, Justice, concurs in result, 
3. Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 201-202, 207 Pac. 462 (1922). 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: (Concurring and Dissenting) 
I concur in holding that the state is responsible for such damages as 
plaintiff may have sustained if they are properly proved. The main opinionano 
the finding of the trial court seem to me to miss the point regarding damaie 
to be awarded. 
In this case the plaintiff had a contract figure which he would be entitle1 
to receive had he finished the job (certain adjustments were agreed upon, but 
the final amount to be paid is not in dispute). The plaintiff would be entitled to 
that figure less am6unts already received and less the reasonable cost of com· 
pleting the project. 
The trial court split the contract into and figured profits on asphaltam 
on sub-contracts; and found certain other items could be completed for the con 
tract price without any profit thereon. 1 
1. For example he claims no profit would be made on the following items in th 
original proposals: 
Flogging 
Pilot Car 1 
Obliteration of Old Road 
Total 
36, 258. 75 cost 
5, 000. 00 
....l:.i 400._.Q.9___ 
43,658.75 
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The court found that the plaintiff had been overpaid for certain items. It also 
-it the remaining work to be performed would total $1, 700, 125. 93 and that 20o/o 
th'. re would be the anticipated profit thereon. Such calculations cannot be the flgU 
for an award. 
I fven if the plaintiff could make a profit of $340, 000 on the unfinished part of he cannot ignore any losses, which he may have sustained on work already b d His profits for which the state is responsible would be on the entire job me • out above. 
The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a correct deter-
ion of damages, tow it: 
The total contract price: $ 
Less: amounts paid thereon: 
Balance due if completed: $ 
Less: cost of completion: 
Damages for lost profits, if any: -"$ ___________ _ 
Jwould award costs to the state, 
J Hall, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the concurring and 
~tnting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Ellett. 
I 
II 
~ I 
-10-
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l\l'Pl:NDIX "ll" 
$tffl3,738.71 to cnvcr tli ... ~ cc~~t of CO.l.l"'lct.iu~J t.h~ c01l~. 1_.~~ct 
and the profLt, iE .:rny, ullc 1~0 fo_;'.'['0!1c1c'lt. 
figure, not the' f_i.gm:-e seh!ctPd Ly Lhe Cou.c-t 1:ould b'" the; 
one to use as J. factor since it. 1·:ould have i~~ccm:; J.n it i:hicl, 
might contain profit. 
The witness ErP.1a Hitchco<::k tcst.i.i:;_,!d c:o;;cc 1 ;1.ing 
Respondent's p_-cofit.: in compl2tiuCJ vc1riou3 cont:i..~act i::cms ac~: 
cording to their figures. 
trapola~ion between the claimeJ profit and the bid price t~ 
costs can be derived. They are as follows: 
Item 
No. Item 
45 Untreated base 140,960.7 
course tons 
46 Bit. s11cface Jfi7,761_.os 
course tons 
47 Plant mix seal 16, 000 tons 
48 Bit. additive 1280 gal.. 
'19 Bit. m3.t2rial 120 Lon;; 
(spreadi 
50 Bit. material 546.89 tons 
HC 70 
Bid Cost 
$ J .(O $ • 65 
3.00 l. 59 
5.00 l. 96 
5.80 4.05 
3:;. 00 5 .13 
10,00 5.13 
Prof i.t 'I'o~al coJ 
$ '95 =~,-~~ ·IJ J_ 1 .. '!,· 
l. t1l 266,740.~1 
I 
3.01 31, 360.1)11 
1.75 5,lW·ll 
29.87 
I 
rn.b!I 
I 
4.87 2, sos.1'1 
! 
51 De2p pen. 17.0 tons ~5.00 13.00 12.00 22u1\ 
a.sphalt 
600.·l! 52 Blotter 50.0 tons 12. 00 '). 00 1 00 
mate:cL:d I 
53 Surface ditches 32,500 ft. . 15 .05 • J 0 l rnnl ___ ,_ ___ I 
1'(,"/'!1.L ~OST Pf:R I<ES P0l'!0.SN'l' 1. 2 2 -8 -~ .1Jc5J: I 
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On page 28 of Appellant's Brief the sum of 
$1,073,708.32 is set forth as the cost of asphalt which 
said amount by specification was a pass through cost and 
not to contain profit. In deducting this sum from the 
figure at the top of the page which is $2,281,646.56 the 
figure of $1,277,938.24 is arrived at in the Brief. This 
figure is in error and the correct amount should have been 
$1,207,938.24. The error was discovered in preparing the 
"summary" for the Petition for Rehearing. 
At the time this case was argued to this Court 
in June, 1978, the Contractor-Respondent argued that Ap-
pellant's calculations resulted in a double deduction of 
certain items. On page 30 of Appellant's Brief the follow-
ing items are listed as deductions: 
l. Stipulated offset for finishing 
topsoil, clean-up, etc. $26,301.48 
2. Offset for embankment finishing $11,055.00 
After reexamination of its theory the State agrees with the 
Contractor, and these amounts are not shown as deductions in 
the "summary" set forth in the State's Brief. 
The next effect of the $70,000.00 error and the 
failure to deduct the two items results in a net decrease of 
$32,643.52 between the anticipated profit of $90,301.35 shown 
on page 32 of Appellant's Brief and the total anticipated 
profit set forth in this Brief of $57,657.83, which sum in-
cludes profit of $27,338.31 on subcontracted items. 
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